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ABSTRACT
The study focuses on an analysis of the King-Byng affair, Canadian constitutional crisis of 1926. Dur-
ing the government crisis in Canada, the British Governor-General Lord Byng of Vimy denied the 
request of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King to dissolve parliament and declare new 
elections. Lord Byng chose a different procedure instead, as a result of which he interfered signifi-
cantly in internal Canadian politics. This incident contributed to a precise definition of the new of-
fice of Governor-General in dominions during the Imperial Conference in London in 1926. The Gov-
ernor-General lost his office as representative of the British government and he became only the 
representative of the British monarch. The aim of this paper is to focus on what role the King-Byng 
affair plays in this transformation of the conception of Governor-General and in the process of es-
tablishment of the independence of Canada from its mother country.
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Canada gained its independence from Great Britain gradually. The history of this pro-
cess does not include any dramatic events, such as revolution or civil war. But we can 
find different incidents here, which pushed this development forwards. One of these 
was the constitutional crisis of 1926, which we can find in Canadian history under the 
name of the King-Byng Affair.3 This affair was named after the two main figures of this 
event, who were William Lyon Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister at the 
time and Julian Hedworth George Byng, the British Governor-General, subsequently 
1st Viscount Byng of Vimy. During the government crisis in 1926 Lord Byng denied the 
Prime Minister’s request to dissolve parliament and declare a new election. He chose 
1 This article was published with the financial support of a  grant provided by GA UK 
No. 250718, with the title of “British-Canadian Relations 1921–1930“, provided by Faculty of 
Arts of Charles University.
2 Martin Šubrt, Institute of World History, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Nám. Jana 
Palacha 2, 116 38, Praha 1, Czech Republic, subrt117@seznam.cz
3 Sometimes also referred to as the King-Byng dispute or Byng-King affair.
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a different procedure instead, as a result of which he interfered significantly in in-
ternal Canadian politics. After this incident, the office of British Governor-General in 
Canada underwent transformation during the Imperial Conference in London in the 
same year. The aim of this paper is to focus on what role this affair plays in the trans-
formation. However, the text will not only focus on the dispute and the function of 
the Governor-General but it will try to define the place that the affair occupies in the 
development of British-Canadian relations and on the way to Canadian independence 
from the mother country. We can also wonder if the affair helped Mackenzie King’s 
political goals. For the purpose of penetrating more deeply into the issue of the dis-
pute between the Canadian Prime Minister and the British Governor-General, we 
must, first of all, introduce both key figures of this affair.
MACKENZIE KING AND LORD BYNG
The longest-serving Prime Minister of Canada was born on 17 December 1874 in On-
tario in the town of Berlin, which was renamed Kitchener in 1916. We can describe 
him as a deeply religious, educated, well-read and lonely man.4 His grandfather on 
his mother’s side was William Lyon Mackenzie, the leader of the rebellion in Upper 
Canada in 1837, whose celebrity as a symbol of the fight against repression he did 
not hesitate to utilise subsequently for his own political career. In addition to his 
famous grandfather, his role model was also Wilfried Laurier the Canadian Prime 
Minister of Liberal Party from the beginning of the twentieth century.5 It was un-
der this Prime Minister that young Mackenzie King began his political career. Lau-
rier was a supporter of Canada’s limited participation in matters of the British Em-
pire, but his opposition towards centralisation of the Empire during the conferences 
held in 1907 and 1921 can be considered rather passive or passive-aggressive.6 When 
Mackenzie King became Prime Minister of Canada it soon became apparent that his 
efforts to change Canada’s direction on the international stage and its independent 
foreign policy towards its mother country would be much more intensive. This ap-
proach can also be considered an expression of the wave of isolationism that arrived 
in Canada from the United States of America.7 His vision clashed with the concept 
of a common imperial policy within the British Empire. Loring Christie, the advisor 
to previous Canadian Prime Ministers Robert Borden and Arthur Meighen, believed 
that if the common imperial policy took the interests of all the parts of the empire 
into consideration, Canada should play an active role in it. The position of the oldest 
4 R. BOTHWELL — I. DRUMMOND — J. ENGLISH, Canada: 1900–1945, Toronto — Buffa-
lo — London 1987, pp. 200–201.
5 J. E. ESBEREY, Personality and Politics: A New Look at the King-Byng Dispute, in: Canadian 
Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 6, No. 1, Mar. 
1973, p. 42.
6 J. T. THOMPSON, Canada and the Third British Empire, in: P. BUCKNER, (ed.), Canada and 
British Empire, New York 2008, p. 90.
7 H. D. HALL, Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations, London 1971, 
p. 477.
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 British dominion in international relations would therefore change from submission 
to responsibility.8 In 1923 Mackenzie King chose a new key advisor for foreign affairs. 
He recruited professor of Queen’s University Oscar Douglas Skelton to be his special 
adviser for Imperial Conference that year and in 1925 appointed him the undersecre-
tary in the Department of External Affairs. Skelton, just like the Prime Minister him-
self, defended the need for an independent Canadian foreign policy and was deeply 
involved in its formation for nearly twenty years from that point on.9 
Mackenzie King was very persistent in his efforts. During negotiations with the 
British he subscribed to the theory that Canada is an autonomous dominion in re-
lation to imperial policy. According to his biographer Blair Neatby, Mackenzie King 
did not wish his attitude to cause fragmentation of the unity of the British Empire, 
but rather to promote the opportunity for Canada to make its own decisions in inter-
national matters, which is why he did not agree to bind the dominion under a com-
mon imperial policy, where Canada may have been too subordinate to the interests 
of Great Britain. However, he believed that if Canada had the opportunity to direct 
its own policy on the international field in the future, this would still fall within the 
broader context of the common imperial policy.10
The second party to the dispute in 1926 was Field Marshal Julian Hedworth George 
Byng, subsequently 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy, who was born on 11 September 1862 in 
Hertfordshire in Great Britain. During his military career he served in India and in 
the Boer Wars. He gained popularity in Canada during the First World War when he 
commanded Canadian forces on the Western Front from 1916. He led his troops into 
the famous battle of Vimy Ridge in 1917, during which the Canadians defeated the 
Germans and his soldiers proudly started to call themselves the Byng boys after their 
commander.11 After the war he was promoted for his services to General and was 
created Baron of Vimy. When Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
offered him the post of Governor-General of Canada in 1921, he was overjoyed, and 
his wife even mentioned that she had never seen him happier.12 
He held this office during the period from 1921 to 1926. At that time the Gover-
nor-General represented the British monarch and also the British government in the 
dominion. He also assured communication with the Colonial Office and subsequently 
with the newly created Dominions Office. For this reason, he played an important 
role on the stage of Canadian internal politics, but as the power of the government 
in Ottawa grew, his office appeared increasingly weaker and more formal. Due to in-
creasing Canadian autonomy he was more and more often seen as an imperial official 
and his office waited for more precise definition until 1926.13
Lord Byng officially assumed his office in August 1921 and he was welcomed very 
enthusiastically in Canada. When meeting with Arthur Meighen, who was Prime 
8 BOTHWELL, p. 232.
9 Ibidem, p. 236.
10 H. B. NEATBY, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924–1932: The Lonely Heights, London 1963, 
p. 32.
11 J. COWAN, Canada’s Governors-General 1867–1952, Toronto 1952, p. 112.
12 Ibidem.
13 R. MacGREGOR DAWSON, Constitutional Issues in Canada: 1900–1931, London 1933, p. 66.
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Minister of Canada at the time, he reputedly apologised for his inexperience in 
a similar position and warned him that he would certainly make mistakes.14 When 
Meighen came to the end of his term in office as Prime Minister, Lord Byng said to 
him, “you are my constitutional advisor and I must act on your advice.”15 Not even 
the new Prime Minister Mackenzie King had any reason to believe that the Gover-
nor-General, who he also considered his friend, would act in opposition to his advice. 
Their mutual relationship between 1922 and 1925 can be considered full of respect 
and understanding and the Prime Minister only spoke of the Governor-General in 
superlatives.16
ELECTIONS IN 1925
We can observe the first stirrings of the internal political crisis in Canada after the 
elections in 1925. The current Prime Minister hoped to continue his Liberal Party’s 
government, which had been in power since 1921 when it replaced a decade of Con-
servative party governments. However, after the votes were counted on 29 October 
1925 it became clear neither of the parties had won a majority and the ratio of power 
in parliament was as follows: the Conservatives held 117 seats and the Liberals won 
100 seats, the Progressive Party of Canada held 23 seats and the remainder were di-
vided between the Labour Party and independent candidates.17 Mackenzie King con-
sidered the results of the election a defeat, which he certainly did not expect. He 
believed that he would win a comfortable majority with his Liberals and that his po-
sition would be even stronger with the potential support of the Progressives, but the 
Liberal Party actually lost 16 mandates compared to the preceding elections and its 
leader was not even elected in his own election district of North York.18
During the period from 30 October to 4 November 1925 he met with the Gover-
nor-General several times to discuss the post-election situation with him. After his 
first meeting with Lord Byng, he rationally considered resigning from the post of 
Prime Minister, but he did not officially submit his resignation to the Governor-Gen-
eral, although Lord Byng agreed with this opinion.19 The Prime Minister was also ex-
pected to resign because it is traditional in Canada, although not obligatory, for the 
leader of the party that won the elections to receive the opportunity to form a gov-
ernment that would undergo a vote of confidence. At their second meeting Macken-
zie King informed Lord Byng of his decision to remain in office and ask the lower 
14 J. WILLIAMS, Byng of Vimy: General and Governor General, 3rd ed., Barnsleys 2014, p. 271.
15 ESBEREY, p. 46.
16 Ibidem.
17 Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa (further only LAC), MG 26, J 2, W. L. Mackenzie King 
Papers: Prime Minister’s Office, E-1100, General Elections 1925, Copy of Code Telegram 
to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from the Governor-General, Ottawa, 4th No-
vember 1925.
18 NEATBY, p. 78.
19 LAC, MG 27, III A, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy fonds, Corre-
spondence and addresses, f. 1.
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house of parliament in Ottawa for a vote of confidence. The Governor-General tried to 
convince him to follow his original plan and resign with dignity. He argued on the ba-
sis of the results of the elections and the fact that the opposition Conservative Party 
had won more seats compared to the preceding elections, but the Prime Minister had 
no intention of changing his opinion.20
On the evening of 4 November 1925 Mackenzie King issued an official statement 
in which he summarised the results of his meetings with Lord Byng. He presented 
three options, which the Governor-General could take: dissolve parliament, which 
would be the route to another election, authorise the leader of the strongest party 
to form a new government or convene parliament as soon as possible so that the 
current Prime Minister could try to continue with the previous administration. 
According to Mackenzie King the most suitable response was the last of these op-
tions, because he believed that the strongest party should not automatically have 
the opportunity to govern, but that this responsibility should fall to the majority 
formed in parliament.21 The Governor-General clearly indicated to the Prime Min-
ister during meetings that he did not like the first option at all. He did not wish to 
dissolve parliament, because in his opinion the Canadians did not want another 
election.22 He was again inclined to take the second option so that Meighen would 
get the opportunity to form a government.23 Although he was of a different opin-
ion, he finally decided to agree to the Prime Minister’s request, but he insisted that 
he must not make any political decisions until he acquired a motion of confidence 
from parliament.24 Their differing viewpoints of the solution to the post-election 
situation became the key cause of their dispute during the crisis in the summer of 
the following year.25
Parliament convened in Ottawa at the beginning of January 1926. At that time 
Mackenzie King was in his office due to the loss of his seat in the lower house and 
he hoped that the rhetorical skills of his colleague and the speaker of the House of 
Commons, Ernest Lapointe, would help him to acquire a motion of confidence in the 
incumbent cabinet.26 This effort was successful and the Prime Minister was able to 
continue in his office, but he was forced to rely on the support of the Progressive 
Party and several other members of parliament.27 He could therefore only hope that 
his government would survive long enough to announce a new election, which would 
assure him a stronger position. 
20 Ibidem.
21 Ibidem, f. 3.
22 Ibidem, f. 2.
23 NEATBY, p. 79.
24 ESBEREY, p. 47.
25 J. VALKOUN, Na cestě k Westminsterskému statutu: Velká Británie, dominia a proměna Britského 
impéria v letech 1907–1931, Praha 2015, p. 220.
26 NEATBY, p. 107.




Representatives of the extensive opposition attempted to make use of the unstable 
position of the newly formed government. Henry Herbert Stevens, a member of par-
liament from the Conservative Party, elected for the district of Vancouver, was pre-
pared to confront the cabinet with a serious problem at the beginning of February 
1926. This concerned the corruption of customs officers and the smuggling of alco-
hol over the Canadian-American borders. At midnight between 2 and 3 February 1926 
Stevens appeared before parliament with a speech in which he accused members of 
the government of corruption and criminal actions. According to his words the Prime 
Minister, Minister of Justice Lapointe and other ministers knew about the corruption 
and failed to take any action against it.28 He demanded that a special parliamentary 
committee be created, which would investigate the whole matter. An all-party com-
mittee with nine members was subsequently appointed and it was expected to create 
a report on the whole affair.29
Leopold Stennett Amery, British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs at the 
time, was also aware of events in Canada. However, Lord Byng did not inform him 
of the political situation in the country in much detail or very often. He only sent 
a memorandum describing post-election developments to London after the cabinet 
was appointed on 18 January 1926.30 This is also why Amery asked him to send regular 
reports about development of the situation in a secret telegram on 12 February 1926, 
because he wanted to have more information about this matter. He focused his atten-
tion on Canada’s internal political situation within the terms of the British Empire.31 
The long-awaited report from the parliamentary committee was completed and 
presented on 18 June 1926, but the Conservatives were disappointed with its con-
tents.32 It stated that customs officers did not work effectively and that the Minister, 
under whose competence the specific field was, failed to fulfil the responsibilities 
of his office.33 Stevens did not intend to come to terms with the conclusions of the 
report and demanded an amendment be attached, which would accuse the entire 
government of corruption.34 On 25 June 1926 it became clear during voting about the 
amendment to the investigation committee’s report that the opposition conservatives 
had managed to draw more members of the Progressive Party to their side. The gov-
ernment would fall if the Progressives ceased to support it, which is why Mackenzie 
King decided to meet with the Governor-General on 26 June 1926 after consulting 
28 J. L. GRANATSTEIN, (ed.), Nation: Canada since Confederation, 3rd ed., Toronto 1990, p. 297.
29 Ibidem, p. 298. 
30 The National Archives, London, Kew, (further only TNA), Dominions Office (further only 
DO) 117/4, Byng of Vimy to L. S. Amery, Government House, Ottawa, 18th January 1926, f. 8.
31 LAC, MG 27, III A, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy fonds, Corre-
spondence and addresses, Secret and personal, L. S. Amery to Lord Byng, 12th February 
1926, f. 10.
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with his colleagues and ask him to dissolve parliament and declare a new election. 
He even instructed his ministers to agree on a date for the elections, but the turn of 
events took him by surprise.35 
Lord Byng decided to deny the Prime Minister’s request. The Governor-General 
had refused to act on the basis of the Prime Minister’s wishes only in very excep-
tional cases throughout Canada’s history and all these incidents also dated from the 
nineteenth century,36 which is why Byng’s refusal of the Prime Minister’s proposal 
was unexpected. On the other hand, there had never been a situation when the Prime 
Minister requested a new election just six months after the cabinet had been appoint-
ed.37 This was a logical step for the Governor-General, because in November of the 
previous year Mackenzie King had stated that he was entitled to remain Prime Min-
ister because he relied on a motion of confidence in parliament, but this confidence 
was not granted in June 1926.38
During several meetings Mackenzie King tried to convince Lord Byng that the 
Governor-General has no reason to refuse a request by the Canadian Prime Minister. 
He even proposed that Byng consult the entire matter with the British Dominions 
Office, which he resolutely refused, because he was convinced that after five years 
as Governor-General in Canada, he was much more familiar with the local situation 
than anyone in London.39 When Mackenzie King realised that he would not succeed 
with his request to dissolve parliament, he decided on 28 June 1926 that he would 
not continue as Prime Minister. He informed Lord Byng of his resignation in a tel-
egram dated the same day. He also informed him that refusal of advice from the 
Canadian Prime Minister could have further serious consequences. In his opinion 
the Governor-General should always ask for instructions from the Dominions Office 
in London in such matters, because he had been sent to Canada by the British gov-
ernment.40 However, it is very surprising that this statement was issued by a Prime 
Minister who was famous for his defence of Canada’s independence from its mother 
country. His biographer Neatby even remarked that the sacred principle of Cana-
dian autonomy was overshadowed by the need for dissolution.41 Constitutional ex-
pert Eugene Forsey argued that this was a thoughtful gesture from Mackenzie King. 
If the Secretary of State for Dominions had given an opinion that the refusal by Lord 
Byng was unconstitutional, the Governor-General might have granted the dissolu-
tion. If Amery had given an opinion that the refusal was constitutional, Macken-
35 NEATBY, p. 145.
36 MacGREGOR DAWSON, p. 65. 
37 W. R. SHARP, The Canadian Election of 1926, in: The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 21, No. 1, Feb. 1927, p. 102.
38 TNA, Cabinet Papers (further only CAB) 24/181/14, Canadian Political Crisis. Note by the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, f. 101.
39 C. P. STACEY, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume: 2, 
1921–1948: The Mackenzie King Era, Toronto 1981, Vol. 2, p. 76.
40 TNA, DO 121/60, Private letters addressed to Lord Byng of Vimy, Governor-General, when 
he declined to dissolve Parliament at the request of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Mac-
kenzie King, Prime Minister’s Office, Ottawa, 28th June 1926, f. 14.
41 NEATBY, p. 150.
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zie King could say that London was interfering in purely Canadian affair.42 Leader 
of Liberals himself then explained his suggestion as “a chivalrous action intended 
to prevent the Governor-General from making the mistake which he did make.“43 
Forsey noted that the suggestion was unconstitutional and Lord Byng did the right 
decision in that case.44
In reaction to this telegram the Governor-General clarified his subsequent actions 
to Mackenzie King. In Byng’s opinion the leader of the opposition, Arthur Meighen, 
should be given the opportunity to form a government. Although Mackenzie King 
believed that the leader of the Conservative Party would be unable to manage this 
task, Lord Byng preferred to make use of all the appropriate options to hastily de-
claring a new election.45 Lord Byng asked Meighen whether he would be willing to 
form a government. He received a positive answer from him and on 29 June 1926 he 
appointed him Prime Minister.46 On the same day he met with the leader of the Pro-
gressive Party, Robert Forke, who assured him that the Progressive Party does not 
support dissolution of parliament for now and is ready to support the new adminis-
tration in continuing the investigation of corrupt customs officers.47
Byng’s approach during the crisis gave rise to conflicting reactions in Canada and 
in Great Britain. Meighen, the newly appointed Prime Minister, believed that Byng 
acted correctly in the entire matter.48 Leopold Stennett Amery, the British Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs, objected to Byng’s procedure and declared, on the soil 
of the British House of Commons on 29 June 1926, that the British cannot interfere in 
the internal matters of the dominions.49 However, at that time Amery had not been 
informed of the situation in sufficient detail, because Lord Byng had sent him only 
a brief telegram a day earlier, in which he informed of his decision to decline to dis-
solve parliament, a decision that was made in the best interests of Canada in his opin-
ion. He also informed him of Mackenzie King’s resignation in this telegram.50
In another message to London on 30 June Lord Byng decided to explain his actions 
in more detail to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. He stated that the Gov-
ernor-General is entitled to decline a request by the Prime Minister if he believes that 
this is the incorrect solution, which is in the interests of neither the country nor its 
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50 LAC, MG 27, III A, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy fonds, Corre-
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consult his decisions with the Office for Dominion Affairs in advance. Byng believed 
that any proposal of a solution to the situation by the British government would be 
considered British interference in Canada’s internal political matters by the Canadian 
people.52 On the following day Amery formulated a response to the Governor-General 
in which he admitted that Lord Byng found himself in a difficult situation and ex-
pressed his support.53 Copies of the correspondence with the Governor-General even 
reached Buckingham Palace through the Dominions Office, where they were read by 
the British monarch, king George V, who actually expressed his opinion that Lord 
Byng “acted constitutionally and probably did the right thing.”54
In the meant time Meighen’s government was due to undergo a vote of confidence. 
At that time the political system in Canada was configured so that members of the 
government surrendered their seat in the House of Commons and underwent sup-
plementary elections, which Meighen and the ministers he appointed did not do, be-
cause if they surrendered their seats in parliament they would certainly not be able 
to assure a motion of confidence in their future government during the voting. The 
previous Minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, protested against this and criticized 
Meighen for illegal procedure.55 On the morning of 2 July 1926 parliament was due 
to decide whether Meighen’s new government would receive a motion of confidence 
or a motion of no-confidence. Following criticism by the Liberals Meighen’s seat was 
empty and it was just the one vote that decided the voting.56 When the final result 
of 96 to 95 votes for a motion of no-confidence in the government was announced, 
member of parliament Thomas William Bird from the Progressive Party stood and 
declared in embarrassment that he had made an error when voting and had voted 
against by mistake. However, the decision was valid, which meant that Meighen did 
not receive a motion of confidence in his government due to an unfortunate acci-
dent.57 This is why he subsequently went to meet with the Governor-General with 
a proposal to dissolve parliament and declare a new election, which meant that Lord 
Byng faced the same request from the Canadian Prime Minister for the second time 
within a very short period, but this time he decided to accept the Prime Minister’s 
proposal.
After Meighen’s government received a vote of no-confidence, Mackenzie King, 
who was a leader of the opposition at the time, sent Lord Byng a telegram in which he 
reminded him that the situation he had warned against had occurred. He reminded 
him of his advice, that Meighen should not be given the opportunity to form a govern-
kenzie King, Copy of Telegram (Cypher) to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
from the Governor General, Ottawa, 30th June 1926, f. 11.
52 Ibidem, Copy of Telegram (Cypher) to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from 
the Governor General, Ottawa, 30th June 1926, f. 12.
53 TNA, CAB 24/180/64, Cabinet, Canadian Political Crisis, Note by the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, Paraphrase Telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
to the Governor General of Canada, 1st July 1926, f. 334. 
54 TNA, DO 117/20, Lord Stamfordham to M. E. Antrobus, Buckingham Palace, 2nd July 1926, 
f. 32.




ment, which he would not receive a motion of confidence for. 58 The Governor-Gen-
eral responded to this message by sending the leader of the Liberal Party a copy of his 
correspondence with London, in which he had explained all his motives.59 
At approximately the same time Byng was sent an encouraging message by the 
former Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden, who informed him that whatever 
the post-election developments in Canada, Lord Byng would always be considered 
a “man guided only by the highest ideals of duty and endowed with the moral cour-
age to put them into force.”60 Byng appreciated this sentiment, but he was aware that 
his decision would require more intensive analysis. This is why he decided to send 
a telegram to London on 17 July 1926, in which he attempted to describe the arising 
situation in which he had played such an active role. He again attempted to clarify 
his decisions, which he believed he had made solely in Canada’s best interests. He also 
considered his actions complied fully with the responsibilities of his office.61
The new elections were to take place on 14 September 1926. The two leaders of the 
competing parties focused on two different topics in their election campaigns. While 
Meighen, hoping that he would capture the interest of voters with internal political 
matters, accused the Liberals of corruption and poor government. Mackenzie King 
tried to shift attention away from these issues and very energetically focused on con-
stitutional matters and the procedure by Lord Byng, who he accused of an attempt 
to transform Canada back into a colony. The leader of the Liberals promised to con-
tinue the fight for an independent Canada, which his grandfather began in 1837. This 
rhetoric was exaggerated but it turned out to be very effective.62 The voters were not 
familiar with the exact development of the situation, but they registered the actions 
of the Governor-General, which were considered interference by London in Canada’s 
internal political affairs.63 Paradoxically, the very thing that Byng was afraid of, be-
cause of which he did not wish to consult his decision with the British government, 
occurred. Mackenzie King managed to transform the elections of 1926 into a referen-
dum for increased Canadian independence from Great Britain. 
After the votes were counted the Liberals held the majority of seats (128) and 
were able to comfortably form a government. The Conservatives suffered a defeat 
and won only 91 seats, while the Progressive Party held 20 seats.64 Mackenzie King 
was able to become Prime Minister once again, this time with a clear majority in the 
House of Commons. The elections in September 1926 also decided that it would be 
58 LAC, MG 27, III A, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy fonds, Cor-
respondence and addresses, Leader to the opposition to The Lord Byng of Vimy, Ottawa, 
3rd July 1926, ff. 21–24.
59 LAC, MG 27, III A, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy fonds, Corre-
spondence and addresses, Byng of Vimy to W. L. Mackenzie King, 5th July 1926, f. 25.
60 TNA, DO 121/60, Private letters addressed to Lord Byng of Vimy, Governor-General, 
when he declined to dissolve Parliament at the request of the Canadian Prime Minister, 
R. L. Borden to the Lord Byng of Vimy, Ottawa, 6th July 1926, f. 5.
61 TNA, DO 117/31, Constitutional difficulties in Canada and New South Wales, Byng of Vimy 
to L. S. Amery, Government House, Ottawa, 17th July 1926, f. 10.
62 BOTHWELL, p. 207. 
63 STACEY, p. 77.
64 GRANATSTEIN, p. 302.
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Mackenzie and his colleagues who would contribute to the conclusions of the Impe-
rial Conference in London a month later, where a decision was to be made about the 
future direction of the British Empire and definition of the status of its individual 
parts.
IMPERIAL CONFERENCE IN 1926
The seventh Imperial Conference took place in London from 19 October to 22 Novem-
ber in 1926. Minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe decided to accompany the Prime Min-
ister to London to represent the oldest British dominion. Although the conflict with 
the Governor-General had strengthened the Canadian Prime Minister’s conviction 
that changes to the definition of the authority of the Governor-General must be made 
at the Imperial Conference, this was not the primary initial impulse in this area. Even 
before the crisis, Mackenzie King and Lord Byng had agreed that the concept of the 
office of Governor General, who was simultaneously a representative of the monarch 
and of the British government, should change. It was clear that the Governor-General 
should only represent the monarch in Canada, because representation of the British 
government no longer corresponded to political developments at the time.65
The conference focused on several agendas, but Mackenzie King appeared to con-
sider work in the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee most important. This committee 
went into session on 27 October 1926 under the chairmanship of experienced but 
older British politician Arthur James Balfour, 1st Earl of Balfour. Individual com-
mittee members were supposed to reach an agreement, mainly on definition of the 
new status of the dominions within the British Empire. The discussed topics also 
included clarification of the role of Governor-General. However, the other commit-
tee members considered Mackenzie King’s demands for changes in this area to be in 
his personal interests and the need of his government alone.66 The Canadian Prime 
Minister required that the Governor-General would be a representative of the crown 
only, which was also related to the fact that he would not be in charge of communica-
tion with the British government in his new position, otherwise he would become an 
agent of the United Kingdom in the dominions, in the words of the Canadian Prime 
Minister. For this reason, Mackenzie King supported establishment of the office of 
British High Commissioner, who would be in charge of communication with the gov-
ernment. He finally managed to obtain the support of the majority of the committee 
for his proposals, with the exception of New Zealand and Newfoundland, Leopold 
Amery subsequently informed the individual governors of the wishes of the Cana-
dian Prime Minister and of the planned changes to their status.67
The so-called Balfour Declaration became the best-known conclusion of the Im-
perial Conference. It was named after the chairman of the committee, Lord Balfour. 
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The text of the declaration became general knowledge chiefly because it defined the 
role of the dominions in the British Empire in more detail: “They are autonomous 
communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one 
to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a com-
mon allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Com-
monwealth of Nations.”68 As a result of the new equal status between the dominions 
and the mother country the final report by the committee confirmed that the office 
of Governor-General would no longer be a representative of the British government 
or any part of it in the individual dominions, but simply the representative of the 
monarch.69 In all other significant aspects he would assume the same status as the 
king in Great Britain.70 All his duties towards London, such as sending reports to the 
Office for Dominion Affairs or his adherence to instructions from the capital city of 
Great Britain, vanished.71 The Governor-General thereby de facto became a viceroy. 
These words were also used by Mackenzie King in his speech before the House of 
Commons in Ottawa during which he presented the new status of this office in Can-
ada a month later.72 
The method by which the Governor-General was appointed also changed. He 
would no longer be chosen by representatives of the British government, but by the 
government of the dominion and would only be formally confirmed by the British 
monarch.73 Mackenzie King had attempted to change the method of appointing the 
Governor-General even earlier. When he discussed potential successors to Lord Byng 
with British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin in February 1926, he wished to select the 
most suitable candidate from a list provided by London, but the decision should be 
made particularly to the satisfaction of Ottawa.74 This was actually a success, because 
he chose the most suitable man from a list of names provided by Baldwin for consid-
eration. In his opinion this was George Freeman Thomas, 1st Viscount of Willingdon.75 
He replaced Lord Byng in his office in September 1926. Mackenzie King had grounds 
to be pleased, because the new Governor General was a Liberal with similar opinions 
to the Canadian Prime Minister, on the contrary to his predecessor. For example they 
jointly defended establishment of the office of British High Commissioner in Can-
ada, who would represent the British government instead of the Governor-General 
and would be in charge of communication with London.76 This office was actually 
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established later on and in April 1928 William Clark was appointed the first British 
High Commissioner in Canada.77
The dominions were also given the right to their own representatives in foreign 
countries in the final report by the Imperial Conference, which Ottawa immediately 
made use of by very quickly establishing a representative office in Washington. The 
classic term of “embassy” was not used in relation to this office, because the Cana-
dians did not wish autonomy in foreign policy to be interpreted as a complete break 
from the British Empire.78 An Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary 
was the term for Canada’s representative in the United States of America, and he 
was appointed by the monarch at the recommendation of ministers of the Canadian 
government and was to be in charge of communication between the Canadian and 
American governments. This office followed on to the role of Canadian representa-
tive, an official at the British Embassy in Washington since 1920. In the absence of the 
British Ambassador, this official represented imperial as well as Canadian interests. 
However, the purpose of the new office was mainly to defend the interests of Ottawa 
and the holder of this office was solely responsible to the Canadian Minister of For-
eign Affairs.79 This was another step, which showed that Canada was striving for an 
independent foreign policy, mainly with regard to its southern neighbour.
CONCLUSION
The King-Byng Affair in 1926 meant more to the subsequent development of Brit-
ish-Canadian relations than is apparent at first glance. This is an unusual case in the 
history of the oldest dominion, when the British Governor-General refused to sub-
mit to the wishes of the Canadian Prime Minister. Although Lord Byng decided to 
act within the boundaries of the authority of his office and, as he believed, in the in-
terests of the Canadian people, the binding decision he made in the summer of 1926 
turned against him. A lot of Canadian historians, politicians or constitutional experts 
have argued the question if Byng chose the right decision. According to Neatby, Byng 
saw Canada’s internal policy as a duel between the Liberals and the Conservatives. 
Since, after the 1925 elections, he considered Meighen as the rightful winner, he was 
more concerned with being fair to Meighen than with anything else. In refusing the 
advice from Mackenzie King “he made the right decision for the wrong reasons.“80 
Arthur Meighen also actually contributed to Byng’s disadvantageous position when 
his attempt to form a government ended in failure. According to Canadian historian 
Phillip Wigley, Meighen should have declined Byng’s endorsement to form a govern-
ment and led a pre-election campaign against Mackenzie King’s government, which 
tried to avoid responsibility by dissolving parliament. Instead, Meighen’s actions ac-
tually discredited the procedure by the Governor-General and placed all the aces back 
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in the hands of Mackenzie King.81 Canadian constitutional expert Eugene Forsey in 
this respect was in favor of Lord Byng. He even defended Meighen’s progression and 
claimed to be logical because there was no necessity for a campaign. In Meighen’s 
opinion the Governor-General was right and Mackenzie King wrong. To have refused 
the office would have been to side with Mackenzie King and against Byng.82
We can state that dissemination of the image of Lord Byng’s procedure as inap-
propriate interference by a British official into Canadian internal politics is based 
on the concept of interpretation of this event by the leader of the Liberal Party at 
the time, who survived the political crisis in 1926 and managed to transform it to his 
benefit. Although it actually looked as if his political career was at an end after his 
resignation, he managed to return as Prime Minister in a stronger position after the 
next election and was able to continue in his vision of an internationally independent 
Canada while Meighen’s political career ended.
Regarding the Governor-General’s position, historian Robert MacGregor Dawson 
argued that after the First World War it had changed to a more formal but his func-
tion as an Imperial officer was still important. It ended in 1926 because of the Byng’s 
refusal to grant a dissolution to Mackenzie King.83 Even though changes to the con-
cept of the office of Governor-General in the dominions had been considered for 
some time and this would probably have occurred even without a dispute between 
Mackenzie King and Lord Byng, the King-Byng affair contributed to precise defini-
tion of the new office of Governor-General during the Imperial Conference in Lon-
don in 1926. Mackenzie King managed to push through his viewpoint, whereas the 
Governor-General was to mainly assume the role of representative of the monarch 
in the future. He lost his office as representative of the British government, which 
de facto prevented any potential interference in Canadian internal politics and con-
firmed the situation that essentially remains to this day. He ceased to be an imperial 
official assuring communication between the governments from 1926. A new office 
of British High Commissioner in Canada was subsequently established for this ad-
ministration. This office we can interpret as better corresponding to the equal rela-
tionship between Great Britain and Canada. All these steps can be perceived within 
the context of the long process of establishment of the independence of the oldest 
British dominium from its mother country. The King-Byng affair takes on the role 
of historic event, as a result of which we can better describe and define this issue. In 
consequence, it helped Mackenzie King accelerate this process, whereby it became 
one of the key points in the journey towards Canada’s independence from its mother 
country and has also greatly helped the political aims of the longest-serving Cana-
dian Prime Minister.
At the imperial conference in London in 1926, the Balfour Declaration, a docu-
ment determining subsequent development of relations between autonomous parts 
of the British Empire and the United Kingdom, defined the new status of the do-
minions within the British Empire, for which the term British Commonwealth of 
Nations was increasingly used. The equality between the dominions themselves and 
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the  dominions and Great Britain was newly clearly defined. The transformation of 
the role of Governor-General complies fully with this definition of equality within 
the British Empire. The new relationship between the United Kingdom and its domin-
ions subsequently came into legal force in the Westminster Statute from 1931, which 
Ottawa very quickly enacted in its legislation. The Westminster Statute confirmed 
Canada’s option to direct its own foreign policy and this was the culmination of one 
part of the long historic development of British-Canadian relations.
